Definition of Privacy and Data Protection

The first definition of privacy was given by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their famous article "The Right to Privacy", which appeared in the Harvard Law Review [Warren/Brandeis 1890]. The two American lawyers defined privacy as "the right to be alone". The reason for this publication was the development of new forms of technologies that was coupled with other developments. Photography used by the yellow press was in the view of the authors an attack on personal privacy in the sense of the right to be alone.

The most common definition of privacy in current use is the one by Alan Westin:

‘Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups and institutions to determine for themselves, when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others’ [Westin 1967].

According to Westin´s definition, natural (individuals) as well as legal persons (groups and institutions) have a right to privacy. In some countries, like France, Austria, Denmark, the juridical concept of privacy protection is extended to groups and institutions, whereas in most others, like in Germany, the USA or the U.K., it is restricted to individuals.

In general, the concept of privacy can be given three aspects [Rosenberg 1992]; [Holvast 1993]:

·        Territorial privacy (by protecting the close physical area surrounding a person, i.e. domestic and other environments such as the workplace or public space);

·         Privacy of the person (by protecting a person against undue interference, such as physical searches, drug testing or information violating his/her moral sense); and

·        Informational privacy (by controlling whether and how personal data can be gathered, stored, processed or selectively disseminated).

Personal data means any information concerning the personal or material circumstances of an identified or identifiable person (the data subject). The emphasis of this Chapter and of this thesis is on the discussion of informational privacy of individuals. Individual informational privacy has also been defined by the German Constitutional Court in its Census Decision of 1983 as the term right of informational self-determination, meaning the right of an individual to determine the disclosure and use of his personal data on principle at his discretion.

Data protection is the protection of personal data in order to guarantee privacy and is only a part of the concept of privacy. Privacy, however, is not an unlimited or absolute right, as it can be in conflict with other rights or legal values, and because individuals cannot participate fully in society without revealing personal data. Privacy and Data Protection laws shall help to protect privacy rights, if personal data is collected, stored or processed.

Privacy in the Global Information Society

Privacy as a social and legal issue has for a long time been a concern of social scientists, philosophers, and lawyers. With the arrival of the computer and increasing capabilities of modern IT-systems and communication networks, individual privacy is increasingly endangered. Especially on the way to a Global Information Society with different national programmes for the further development of data highways, there are severe privacy risks. Privacy as a fundamental human right recognised in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and in many other international and regional treaties [PI/EPIC 1999] has to be protected in a democratic society.

In general, privacy protection can be undertaken by

• privacy and data protection laws promoted by government

• self-regulation for fair information practices by codes of conducts promoted by

businesses

• privacy-enhancing technologies adopted by individuals

• privacy education of consumers and IT professionals.

In this Chapter, privacy risks and means of privacy protection are discussed and analysed. In the first part, a definition of privacy and an overview to privacy legislation is given. Then, privacy risks in the Global Information Society are discussed, and it is shown that privacy is becoming more and more an international problem. For this reason, an international harmonisation of privacy legislation besides the EU Directive on data protection is needed. However, it shows that, due to cultural, political and historical differences, there are significant deviations in the EU approach to privacy protection from the privacy regulations of other countries, which have developed information infrastructure programmes. Although the EU Directive on Data Protection might have a coercive effect also on countries outside the EU to enact efficient data protection legislation based on the EU Directive, a common international harmonised approach seems hardly feasible. Therefore, it is argued that besides privacy protection by legislation and code of conducts, privacy enhancing technologies as a means to technically enforce legal privacy requirements are becoming increasingly important. Finally, the importance of privacy education complementary to privacy enhancing technologies is pointed out.

The Case for Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) in Proactive Network Defense

It’s widely accepted that Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems are excellent tools for regulatory compliance, log management and analysis, trouble-shooting and forensic analysis. What’s surprising to many is that this technology can play a significant role in actively defending your network. This whitepaper explains precisely how real-time analysis, combined with in-memory correlation, and automated notification and remediation capabilities can provide you with unprecedented network visibility, security and control.

Information technology and security professionals are literally drowning in data. The devices and systems they’ve deployed to protect their organizations generate millions of events every day which are virtually impossible

to analyze without automation. In spite of the complexity, this data must be analyzed - both to ensure the integrity of the customer, credit card, or patient data, and also to meet serious regulatory requirements and fiduciary responsibilities.

To be effective in network defense, and not just for forensic analysis, the network and security event data must also be analyzed and correlated in real-time. This information needs to be manageable and actionable as well. Forensics are not enough. Detecting and stopping today’s zero-day, multi-vector and blended threats requires real-time, in-memory, analystics that can capture, correlate and respond to network attacks and insider abuse - at network speed. There are numerous obstacles to performing this task efficiently, securely and with minimal personnel resources.

The information being analyzed from log files needs to be manageable and actionable. Forensics are not enough. Detecting and stopping today’s zero-day, multi-vector and blended threats requires real-time, in-memory, analystics that can capture, correlate and respond to network attacks and insider abuse - at network speed.

Countermeasure: DNS Security

DNS information provides a plethora of information to attackers, so it is important to reduce the amount of information available to the Internet. From a host configuration perspective, you should restrict zone transfers to only authorized servers. For modern versions of BIND, the allow-transfer directive in the named.conf file can be used to enforce the restriction. To restrict zone transfers in Microsoft’s DNS, you can use the Notify option. (See http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q193/8/37.asp for more information.) For other nameservers, you should consult the documentation to determine what steps are necessary to restrict or disable zone transfers.

On the network side, you could configure a firewall or packet-filtering router to deny all unauthorized inbound connections to TCP port 53. Since name lookup requests are UDP and zone transfer requests are TCP, this will effectively thwart a zone transfer attempt. However, this countermeasure is a violation of the RFC, which states that DNS queries greater than 512 bytes will be sent via TCP. In most cases, DNS queries will easily fit within 512 bytes. A better solution would be to implement cryptographic Transaction Signatures (TSIGs) to allow only “trusted” hosts to transfer zone information. For a step-by-step example of how to implement TSIG security, see http://romana.ucd.ie/james/tsig.html.

Restricting zone transfers will increase the time necessary for attackers to probe for IP addresses and hostnames. However, since name lookups are still allowed, attackers could manually perform lookups against all IP addresses for a given net block. Therefore, configure external name servers to provide information only about systems directly connected to the Internet. External nameservers should never be configured to divulge internal network information. This may seem like a trivial point, but we have seen misconfigured nameservers that allowed us to pull back more than 16,000 internal IP addresses and associated hostnames. Finally, we discourage the use of HINFO records. As you will see in later chapters, you can identify the target system’s operating system with fine precision. However, HINFO records make it that much easier to programmatically cull potentially vulnerable systems.

Countermeasure: Public Database Security

Much of the information contained in the various databases discussed thus far is geared at public disclosure. Administrative contacts, registered net blocks, and authoritative name server information is required when an organization registers a domain on the Internet. However, security considerations should be employed to make the job of attackers much more difficult. Many times an administrative contact will leave an organization and still be able to change the organization’s domain information.

Thus, first ensure that the information listed in the database is accurate. Update the administrative, technical, and billing contact information as necessary. Furthermore, consider the phone numbers and addresses listed. These can be used as a starting point for a dial-in attack or for social engineering purposes. Consider using a toll-free number or a number that is not in your organization’s phone exchange.

In addition, we have seen several organizations list a fictitious administrative contact, hoping to trip up a would-be social engineer. If any employee receives an email or calls to or from the fictitious contact, it may tip off the information security department that there is a potential problem.

Another hazard with domain registration arises from the way that some registrars allow updates. For example, the current Network Solutions implementation allows automated online changes to domain information. Network Solutions authenticates the domain registrant’s/identity through three different methods: the FROM field in an email, a password, or via a Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) key. Shockingly, the default authentication method is the FROM field via email. The security implications of this authentication mechanism are prodigious. Essentially, anyone can trivially forge an email address and change the information associated with your domain, better known as domain hijacking. This is exactly what happened to AOL on October 16, 1998, as reported by the Washington Post. Someone impersonated an AOLofficial and changed AOL’s domain information so that all traffic was directed to autonete.net. AOL recovered quickly from this incident, but it underscores the fragility of an organization’s presence on the Internet. It is important to choose a more secure solution like password or PGP authentication to change domain information. Moreover, the administrative or technical contact is required to establish the authentication mechanism via Contact Form from Network Solutions.

BitDefender Internet Security 2011

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That which scares you but is not Real Threat

"Scareware" (or "extortionware" as I call it, fake antivirus/antispy programs like XP Antivirus 2009/2010) prevention tips from redondmag.com, an online IT publication:

• Use a firewall
• Use anti-virus
• Use anti-spyware
• Use a legitimate copy of Windows in order to get updates
• Keep Windows regularly and automatically updated and patched
• When a pop-up appears, check the source and remove it via the system tray; do not click the close button or any part of the pop-up
• Use an alternative browser and lock it down; no Active X, scripts or Java
• Don't give out admin rights
• Consider Windows Vista, or Linux or a Mac